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I. INTRODUCTION
A 2009 Gallup poll found that more than 90 percent of those surveyed
believed a judge should be disqualified from hearing a case if a party appearing
before that judge has contributed to the judge’s election campaign.1  Other
polls have found that 79 percent of businesses2 and even 26 percent of judges3
believed campaign contributions have at least some impact on judicial deci-
sions.  These polls indicate a growing concern among citizens, businesses, and
the judiciary that money is manipulating the fair administration of justice.4
Additionally, of the thirty-nine states that have some form of judicial election
system in place,5 at least fourteen are reevaluating their judicial recusal stan-
dards6 in light of the growing risk of monetary influence in the judiciary.7
Recent studies and events have encouraged states to adapt their judicial
codes and laws to the reality of increased campaign money in judicial elections.
Previously, despite authoritative evidence indicating that judicial elections were
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1 Joan Biskupic, At the Supreme Court, a Case with the Feel of a Best Seller, USA TODAY,
Feb. 17, 2009, at 1A.
2 CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 105
(2009).
3 Terry Carter, Boosting the Bench, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2002, at 29, 34.
4 Kenneth Jost, Judicial Elections, 19 CQ RESEARCHER 375, 376 (2009) (noting the concern
of Bret Brandenburg, executive director of Justice at Stake).
5 Id. at 375; Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J.
1077, 1094 (2007).
6 While judicial elections comprise a wide range of issues, including the ongoing debate of
selection reform, this Note primarily focuses on critiquing recent disqualification proposals
based solely on campaign contributions. See discussion infra Part IV.
7 See Recusal Reform in the States After Caperton v. Massey, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST.
(Nov. 20, 2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/state_judicial_reform_
efforts_2009/ (follow “2009-10 Judicial Disqualification Initiatives in the States” hyperlink).
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becoming increasingly expensive,8 states consistently avoided the controversial
task of expanding their respective recusal standards to include a provision that
required disqualification when a judge had received significant and dispropor-
tionate campaign contributions9 from a party appearing before that judge in a
case.10  However, the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc. has encouraged many state legislatures to
craft provisions requiring disqualification at certain monetary thresholds.11  In
Caperton, the Court held that the failure of a judge to recuse himself or herself
upon receiving an excessive and disproportionate amount of campaign support
from a party or litigant appearing in a case creates a “probability of bias” that
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.12  However,
the Court—recognizing that the situation in Caperton was extreme—reaf-
firmed that states have the discretion to “adopt recusal standards more rigorous
than due process requires” in order to protect judicial integrity.13
This Note discusses whether recent state judicial-disqualification propos-
als effectively balance the independence traditionally afforded to judges with
the risk posed to due process by excessive campaign contributions.  Section II
examines the historical development of judicial disqualification, elections, and
campaign spending.  Section III discusses Caperton v. Massey and the
“probability of bias” standard that it reaffirmed.  Section IV categorizes and
8 See Jost, supra note 4, at 377.
9
“Contribution” technically refers to the gifting of money or anything else of value with the
coordination of the candidate. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A) (2006) (defining contribution on
the Federal level); see also Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualification in the Aftermath of
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 247, 261 (2010) (distinguishing
contributions from independent expenditures).  “Independent expenditure” refers to spending
one’s own money not in coordination with the candidate. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (defining
independent expenditure on the federal level); Rotunda, supra, at 261.  While independent
expenditures are constitutionally protected as free speech, the states have much greater lee-
way in regulating contributions. Id.  For simplicity, this Note will generally refer to “contri-
bution” as both (1) monetary and in-kind gifts made directly or indirectly to a judicial
candidate by an individual, organization, or through a third-party intermediary, and (2) inde-
pendent expenditures that either directly or indirectly advocate for the defeat of a judicial
candidate.  However, this Note will sometimes differentiate between the two types of activ-
ity to emphasize the importance of creating a disqualification rule that takes into account
both contributions and independent expenditures. See infra Part IV.
10 See JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION PROJECT, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL DIS-
QUALIFICATION PROJECT 26 (discussion draft 2008), http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/ABA
Judicialdisqualificationprojectreport.pdf (noting that only two states, Mississippi and Ala-
bama, have adopted provisions accounting for campaign contributions to judicial
candidates).
11 At least California, Louisana, Montana, Nevada, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin have
proposals that would implement a monetary threshold for disqualification.  See Recusal
Reform in the States After Caperton v. Massey, supra note 7 (describing California, Mon-
tana, Nevada, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin proposals); Special Edition: Judicial
Recusal Legislation, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Williamsburg, Va.), July
2009, at 1, 5-6, available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/gaveltogavel/G%20to%
20G%20Special%20Recusal%20Edition.pdf (describing Louisiana proposal).
12 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263-64 (2009).
13 Id. at 2265-67 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Judicial integrity is, in consequence, a state interest of the high-
est order.”)).
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critiques five state disqualification proposals that would create a monetary
threshold for disqualification based on campaign contributions.  Finally, Sec-
tion V argues that the lack of transparency and relaxed standards in judicial
campaign-finance reporting must be effectively addressed in order for any dis-
qualification rule based on campaign contributions to succeed.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION, ELECTIONS,
AND CAMPAIGN SPENDING
A historical overview of judicial disqualification is necessary to evaluate
reform measures that attempt to balance traditional judicial independence
against the potential due process violation created by excessive and dispropor-
tionate campaign contributions.  This section examines the alarming context in
which states have recognized the need for disqualification reform: first, by
describing the historical background of judicial disqualification; second, by
summarizing the current state of disqualification; third, by noting the sharp rise
in judicial elections; fourth, by briefly discussing three alternative selection
methods that have attempted to abate the drastic increase in campaign spend-
ing; and, finally, by examining the present-day effect of campaign contributions
on the judiciary.
A. Historical Underpinnings of Judicial Disqualification
European civil law and common law countries had markedly different
approaches regarding the appropriate circumstances under which judicial dis-
qualification should be mandated.  In the early history of Roman law, litigants
had the right to disqualify (or recuse)14 judges who were “under suspicion” of
being biased.15  This practice was common among civil law countries for hun-
dreds of years.16  In contrast, the English placed more confidence in judicial
impartiality.17  Sir William Blackstone, a prominent English judge and profes-
sor, opined on the ability of English society to hold judges accountable in the
“isolated” cases in which judges were overcome by their bias.18  Furthermore,
England’s common law system deemphasized the need for judicial recusal
except in instances where the judge had a direct financial interest in the out-
come of a case.19  The long-standing adage that “[n]o man shall be a judge in
his own case” had taken its hold on the English court system, but its practical
14
“Disqualification” technically refers to the mandatory removal of a judge in accordance
with the applicable statute.  “Recusal” describes voluntary removal based on the judge’s own
discretion.  However, this Note will follow the general practice of modern scholarship,
which uses both terms interchangeably. See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICA-
TION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 1.1, at 3-4 (2d ed. 2007).
15 Id. § 1.2, at 5; see also JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION PROJECT, supra note 10, at 5 (quoting
an amendment to the Justinian Code, which emphasized the importance of disqualification in
cases of suspected bias).
16 JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION PROJECT, supra note 10, at 5.
17 Id. at 6.
18 Id.
19 Id.
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application only focused on direct conflicts of interest and excluded recusal
based on the mere suspicion of bias.20
Unlike in England, the Founding Fathers generally placed less confidence
in U.S. judges to perform their duties as impartial arbiters.21  The Founders
decided on a federal appointment system,22 which the states initially mir-
rored,23 in an effort to suppress the rampant political influence on the judiciary
at the time.24  Still, there was enough trust in the impartiality of judges that
judicial recusal was only required in the narrowest of circumstances.25  As in
England, judges disqualified themselves at their own discretion, and recusal
was only required when a judge had conflicts of interest from previous legal
matters26 or when the judge had a direct financial interest in the case.27
In the early twentieth century, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
American Bar Association (ABA) attempted to clarify and limit the situations
in which a judge could be impartial.  In 1911, Congress enacted legislation,
eventually codified at 28 U.S.C. § 144, which was the first federal statute to
include the possibility of extrajudicial bias as a basis for disqualification.28
The legislation required the party seeking disqualification to file an affidavit
stating that party’s “reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists . . . .”29
If granted, the motion would allow another judge to be assigned to the proceed-
ing.30  In 1924, the ABA adopted the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which promul-
gated model guidelines that required judges to be “free from impropriety and
20 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
21 Matthew J. Streb, The Study of Judicial Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING
POLITICAL, FINANCIAL AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 1, 8 (Matthew J. Streb
ed., 2007) (discussing Alexander Hamilton’s distrust of the relationship between the King of
England and the judiciary).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 8-9.
24 Id. at 8.
25 John A. Meiser, The (Non)Problem of a Limited Due Process Right to Judicial Disquali-
fication, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1799, 1804 (2009) (discussing the narrow situations that
required judicial recusal).
26 Id. at 1804 n.41.
27 John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609-12 (1947) (discussing
how judges were disqualified for “direct pecuniary interest and nothing else”).
28 Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§ 20-21, 36 Stat. 1087, 1090 (1911).  The statute was not
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 144 until 1948.  Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 144, 62 Stat. 869,
898 (1948) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C § 144 (2006)).
29 Act of March 3, 1911, § 21, 36 Stat. at 1090.
30 Id. §§ 14, 20, 36 Stat. at 1089-90.  State governments followed suit by adopting similar
disqualification laws of their own. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (barring judicial partic-
ipation in a case “wherein he may be interested, or where either of the parties may be con-
nected with him, by affinity or consanguinity, within such degrees as now are, or may
hereafter be prescribed by Law, or where he shall have been of counsel in the case”); Ken-
neth S. Kilimnik, Recusal Standards for Judges in Pennsylvania: Cause for Concern, 36
VILL. L. REV. 713, 719 n.21 (1991) (noting that Pennsylvania passed judicial disqualification
laws in 1816 and 1825). However, some American colonies had already enacted similar
disqualification laws as early as the late seventeenth century. See, e.g., FLAMM, supra note
14, § 28.8, at 838 (describing how Connecticut has had its own disqualification law since
1672).
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the appearance of impropriety.”31  Thirty years later, in In re Murchison, the
Supreme Court finally recognized the importance of requiring judges to be free
from actual bias as well as the “appearance of bias” in order to ensure a fair
trial in accordance with due process.32
Finally, in 1972, the ABA adopted the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(Model Code), which condensed the various ethical notions surrounding judi-
cial disqualification into a single set of rules.33  Specifically, Rule 2.11 pro-
vided that a judge would be subject to disqualification “in a proceeding in
which [the judge’s] impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but
not limited to” instances in which the judge had an actual bias concerning a
party or lawyer, or some other interest in the case.34  This language was much
broader than 28 U.S.C. § 144, which allowed judges to escape disqualification
by ruling that the alleged disqualifying acts were not legally sufficient to con-
stitute actual “bias and prejudice.”35  Two years later, Congress revised 28
U.S.C. § 455 in an effort to supplant the ineffective language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 144 with diction that more closely resembled the 1972 Model Code.36  In
1990, the 1972 Model Code was revised to include a provision allowing parties
to waive disqualification for any reason other than actual bias so long as all
parties agreed that the judge would be impartial.37
Today, most of the provisions under Rule 2.11(A) are mirrored by the
judicial conduct codes of forty-seven states and Washington, D.C.38  These
rules provide disqualification standards above those which due process, under
the U.S. Constitution, minimally requires.39
In 1999, the ABA added Rule 2.11(A)(4) to the Model Code, which
requires disqualification when “a party or a party’s lawyer” has contributed an
amount of money, to be determined by the state, over a certain period of time.40
31 JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION PROJECT, supra note 10, at 8 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
32 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
33 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C (1972) (current version at MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2007)).
34 Id. Canon 3(C)(1).
35 Frank, supra note 27, at 629.
36 Brian Downing, Action, Accountability, and the Judiciary: United States Federal Judicial
Recusal Reform in a New Century, HALT (Aug. 9, 2001), http://www.halt.org/reform_
projects/judicial_integrity/pdf/History_of_Judicial_Recusal.pdf.
37 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3F (1990).
38 See JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 4.02, at 4-7 to 4-8 (4th ed.
2007) (noting that most state courts have interpreted the phrasing “should disqualify” and
“shall disqualify” to both have the same mandatory effect); FLAMM, supra note 14, § 2.6, at
39.  The few states that have not adopted the language of Rule 2.11(A) may still require
disqualification in some circumstances. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(2)(a) (Texas rules of civil
procedure incorporate Rule 2.11’s language); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.04(4); Adair v. State, 709
N.W.2d 567, 581-82 (Mich. 2006) (Cavanagh, J., statement) (proposing a rule for Michigan
that would incorporate similar standard); Washington v. Mont. Mining Properties, Inc., 795
P.2d 460, 466 (Mont. 1990) (Sheehy, J., dissenting) (noting that Canon 3E(1), now R. 2.11,
may require disqualification).
39 FLAMM, supra note 14, § 2.5.2, at 34-39.
40 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1)(e) (1999).
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This rule has remained the same notwithstanding minor changes in 2007.41
The controversial rule attempts to encourage states to “fill-in-the-blank” with
an appropriate maximum threshold amount, which, in theory, would eliminate
incentives for parties and lawyers to influence judicial decision-making through
significant campaign contributions.42
The current Model Code requires that the actual or apparent bias of the
judge be directly related to the issue or case before the judge, and that the bias
must be personal—for example, a personal or financial relationship with a
party to the proceeding that could be substantially affected by the proceeding.43
However, Courts differ on the evidentiary burden and the process used for dis-
qualification proceedings.  The standard ranges from a showing of compelling
evidence to a preponderance of the evidence.44  Although some states require
challenged judges to hold disqualification hearings, most states leave disqualifi-
cation solely to the judge’s discretion.45  In most jurisdictions, judges are not
required to give an official explanation for their decision to recuse.46
1. The Modern Balancing Act of Judicial Disqualification
The current debate surrounding disqualification concerns the delicate bal-
ance between providing standards that safeguard due process47 and upholding
the independence traditionally afforded to judges.48  Financial burdens associ-
ated with filing and defending a disqualification motion and the fear of anger-
ing judges with unsuccessful motions are cited as barriers to widespread use
and enforcement;49 however, discontent directed toward federal and state
recusal laws still manages to spur the movement in support of stricter recusal
standards.50
41 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(4) (2007) (The rule states that a judge
shall be disqualified when the “judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a
party, a party’s lawyer, or the law firm of a party’s lawyer has within the previous [insert
number] year[s] made aggregate contributions to the judge’s campaign in an amount that [is
greater than $[insert amount] for an individual or $[insert amount] for an entity] [is reasona-
ble and appropriate for an individual or an entity].”) (alterations in original).
42 JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FAIR COURTS: SETTINGS RECUSAL
STANDARDS 29 (2008) [hereinafter SAMPLE ET AL., FAIR COURTS],  available at http://bren-
nan.3cdn.net/1afc0474a5a53df4d0_7tm6brjhd.pdf/.
43 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R 2.11.
44 SAMPLE ET AL., FAIR COURTS, supra note 42, at 40 n.63.
45 See Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges?, 28 VAL.
U. L. REV. 543, 546-51 (1994) (explaining various methods states employ); see also FLAMM,
supra note 14, § 17.6, at 498-507.
46 PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND
ETHICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 19 (1990) (noting the deference given to the
judge on appellate review of recusal motions).
47 SAMPLE ET AL., FAIR COURTS, supra note 42, at 43 n.89 (criticizing the argument that
focusing on the appearance of bias will distract from issues of actual bias).
48 See generally Jack N. Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95
GEO. L.J. 1061 (2007) (discussing the fundamental principle of judicial independence).
49 SAMPLE ET AL., FAIR COURTS, supra note 42, at 20 (discussing potential reasons for the
underuse and under-enforcement of disqualification motions).
50 See FLAMM, supra note 14, § 23.1, at 669-70 (discussing federal recusal statutes); see
generally id. §§ 27-28, at 789-906 (listing state recusal laws and provisions).
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Moreover, modern studies on social psychology show that “much bias is
unconscious and that people tend to underestimate and undercorrect for their
own biases.”51  Recent polling data on the effect of campaign contributions on
judicial decision-making comports with the results of these studies, making the
implicit suggestion that donning a black robe is not an impenetrable shield from
inherent fallibility.52  As was noted in the amicus curiae of former chief justices
and justices in Caperton, “every judge is first and foremost a human being, not
a detached and unemotional law machine.”53  Judicial independence is a funda-
mental characteristic of an impartial judiciary; however, it comes with the una-
voidable risk of judicial bias.
Even with this recent evidence, most states have been hesitant to adopt
Model Rule 2.11(A)(4) or similar disqualification language that takes into
account campaign support, no matter how large.54  Notably, motions to disqual-
ify judges due to receipt of substantial campaign contributions regularly fail.55
Only two states have adopted provisions that include at least some language
from Model Rule 2.11(A)(4), which requires a judge to recuse upon receipt of
campaign contributions over an unspecified amount.56  The first state, Missis-
sippi, allows a party to “file a motion to recuse a judge . . . [if] an opposing
party or counsel . . . is a major donor to the [judge’s] election campaign.”57
The second state, Alabama, requires the recusal of a judge from “a case [in]
which there may be an appearance of impropriety because[,] as a candidate[,]
the justice or judge received a substantial contribution from a party to the case,
including attorneys for the party.”58  However, the Alabama Supreme Court
has failed to adopt any rules or procedures to implement the statute.59
51 SAMPLE ET AL., FAIR COURTS, supra note 42, at 20; see also Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial
Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1248-50 (2002).
52 Carter, supra note 3, at 34 (reporting a recent poll indicating that 26 percent of judges
believe campaign contributions have at least some impact on judicial decisions).
53 Brief Amicus Curiae of 27 Former Chief Justices and Justices in Support of Petitioners at
6, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22).
54 See JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION PROJECT, supra note 10, at 73.
55 John Copeland Nagle, The Recusal Alternative to Campaign Finance Legislation, 37
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 69, 87-88 (2000) (“[S]cholarly opinion is just as unanimous that a cam-
paign contribution should require a judge to recuse as the courts are agreed that recusal is
unnecessary.”).
56 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(4) (2007).
57 MISS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(2) (2010).  A “major donor” is defined as:
[A] donor who or which has, in the judge’s most recent election campaign, made a contribution
to the judge’s campaign of (a) more than $2,000 if the judge is a justice of the Supreme Court or
judge of the Court of Appeals, or (b) more than $1,000 if the judge is a judge of a court other
than the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals.
Id. terminology (c).  “[C]ontribution[s] to the judge’s campaign” also includes in-kind dona-
tions, advertisements, and publications, other than “bona fide news item[s] published by
existing news media,” which advocate for a judge or criticize his or her opponent. Id. termi-
nology (d) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58 ALA. CODE §§ 12-24-1 to 12-24-2 (2006).
59 JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION PROJECT, supra note 10, at 26 n.109; see also Peter A. Joy,
A Professionalism Creed for Judges: Leading by Example, 52 S.C. L. REV. 667, 675, 675
n.28 (2001) (arguing for automatic disqualification in the Alabama statute).
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The preamble of the current Model Code states that “[a]n independent, fair
and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of justice.”60  This provi-
sion demonstrates the expectation that judges decide cases fairly and without
“undue influence.”61  However, there is no current empirical data on the effec-
tiveness of disqualification motions and recusal decisions.62  Furthermore,
some critics believe that stricter disqualification rules will encourage litigants
to “actively search” for any reason to question a judge’s impartiality—that is,
crafty lawyers may exploit loopholes in disqualification rules to intentionally
remove a disfavored judge from hearing a case.63  By directing efforts to dis-
qualify judges, stricter recusal standards might “prevent the best judge from
hearing [a] case.”64  Finally, other judges note that any disqualification based
on apparent bias would result in a drastic increase in the number of disqualifi-
cation motions, creating significant administrative burdens and delays on
courts.65  Although the debate involving due process and disqualification is
unlikely to end anytime soon, these conflicting interests must be addressed in
any disqualification rule that attempts to control the growing influence of
money in the judiciary.
B. The Rise of Judicial Elections
Analyzing the rise of judicial elections is essential to understanding the
marked increase in campaign spending and the need for greater reform.  In
1788, Alexander Hamilton expressed trepidation about judicial elections
because of the potential risk it posed to judicial independence: “The complete
independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential [under] a limited
Constitution.”66  To avoid political influence on the judiciary, the Founders
decided on an appointment system in which federal judges would serve life-
terms.67  However, the states, although they initially adopted similar systems,
were still preoccupied with the inherent conflict and lack of accountability that
existed between judges and England’s royalty.68  The states’ distrust of politi-
cal and business elites, who were seen to be in control of the selection of
judges, amplified the negative perception of an appointed judiciary.69  Ameri-
cans were also concerned about the difficulty of the impeachment process and
60 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl.
61 See Julie A. Robinson, Judicial Independence: The Need for Education About the Role of
the Judiciary, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 535, 540 (2007).
62 SAMPLE ET AL., FAIR COURTS, supra note 42, at 20.
63 See Sarah M. R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1, 18-21 (2007)
(describing the danger in overvaluing the public’s perception of the judiciary at the expense
of actual judicial integrity).
64 Meiser, supra note 25, at 1828 (emphasis omitted).
65 Charles Gardner Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence in the Courts in an Age of Individ-
ual Rights and Public Skepticism, in BENCH PRESS: THE COLLISION OF THE COURTS, POLIT-
ICS, AND THE MEDIA 21, 41-43 (Keith J. Bybee ed., 2007).
66 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 451 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass’n ed. 2009) (1788).
67 Id. at 453-55.
68 Streb, supra note 21, at 8-9.
69 Jost, supra note 4, at 381.
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the belief that the judiciary needed to be more responsive to the peoples’ needs,
rather than to the desires of the legislative branch.70
Pervading all of these reasons was the rise of Jacksonian Democracy,71
which motivated the common man to question the status quo of appointed offi-
cials and advocate for popular elections, which were associated with accounta-
bility to the people.72  By the 1830s, many states were amending their
constitutions to require judicial elections.73  However, by the early twentieth
century, the proliferation of political machines led many to believe that “com-
pelling judges to become politicians . . . [was] destroy[ing] the traditional
respect held for the bench.”74
C. Alternative Selection Methods
It is worth mentioning that several comprehensive selection reforms
emerged in the twentieth century to combat the growing influence of party
politics and special interest campaign contributions in judicial elections.
Restrictions and outright abolishment of state judicial elections have largely
failed over the past twenty years; however, other selection reforms have
recently gained considerable traction.75  Three of the most popular selection
reforms include nonpartisan judicial elections,76 publicly financed elections,77
and the “merit-based” Missouri Plan.78
Many states implemented nonpartisan judicial elections in an effort to rid
the judiciary of partisan politics and the distortions it brought to the judiciary.79
As of June 2009, six states had given up partisan elections in favor of nonparti-
san elections.80  However, even this reform failed to stop the politicization of
the selection process and inevitably still attracted many of the same corrupting
interests.81  Indeed, recent studies show that nonpartisan state supreme court
70 Streb, supra note 21, at 9.
71
“Jacksonian Democracy” is the political philosophy associated with President Andrew
Jackson and his followers.  During the 1820s to the 1850s, this philosophy promoted basic
democratic principles, including expanded political participation by the “common man” and
greater government accountability. See generally RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE UNION AT RISK:
JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS (1989).
72 Streb, supra note 21, at 9.
73 Id.
74 Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
46 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 55, 66 (1962).
75 James Bopp, Jr. & Anita Y. Woudenberg, Extreme Facts, Extraordinary Case: The Sui
Generis Recusal Test of Caperton v. Massey, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 305, 307 (2010)
(“[B]allot measure[s] have been rejected by the voters in Pennsylvania, Illinois, Nevada,
Tennessee, Florida, Oregon, Arkansas, Ohio, Louisiana and South Dakota, in some cases,
multiple times.”).
76 BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 2, at 3.
77 Jost, supra note 4, at 377 (noting that North Carolina and New Mexico currently have
public financing for judicial campaigns).
78 BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 2, at 3.
79 Streb, supra note 21, at 10 (describing the effort to drive out “machine politics” and its
corrupting influence in the states).
80 BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 2, at 3 (Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, and
North Carolina).  As of April 2009, there were thirteen nonpartisan judicial election states
and eight partisan judicial election states.  Jost, supra note 4, at 376.
81 Streb, supra note 21, at 10.
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elections actually increase the “demands on judges to solicit campaign
contributions.”82
Public financing is another possible solution to the rise of campaign
spending in judicial elections.83  In North Carolina and Wisconsin, this system
is funded by a state tax return check-off,84 similar to the check-off on federal
tax returns.85  In the few states that have public financing, contributions to
supreme court candidates have been reduced;86 however, candidates in North
Carolina must still raise a minimum of thirty times the filing fee from at least
350 contributors to receive public funding.87  Additionally, some candidates
may refuse public funding to circumvent campaign spending limits, thus bring-
ing campaign money and influence back into judicial elections.88  Even Seth
Andersen, executive director of the American Judicature Society89 and general
supporter of judicial election reform, feels that public financing “may . . . exac-
erbate the problem because ‘legitimate money’ can’t go to the candidates them-
selves[,] . . . entic[ing] . . . well-heeled groups to break the system.”90  Thus,
public financing programs, while attractive in theory, might still fail to elimi-
nate the influence of money in the judiciary.
Finally, in 1940, Missouri became the first state to adopt the “Missouri
Plan,” a merit-based appointment system.91  The most common version of the
Missouri Plan involves a nominating commission selecting a judge, who is sub-
sequently appointed by the governor and subject to retention elections.92  At
least seven states have switched to this plan from partisan elections93 and sev-
enteen states in total have some form of a combined merit-retention election
system.94  This system, in theory, was supposed to combine “the best features
of appointed ([judicial] independence) and elected (accountability) schemes.”95
While reducing spending overall, the Missouri Plan has also failed to contain
the monetary influence of powerful interest groups who wish to oust a judge
during a retention election with targeted funds.96  Indeed, well-heeled groups
and individuals have greatly influenced the outcome of judicial elections based
82 BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 2, at 66.
83 Jost, supra note 4, at 377.
84 BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 2, at 125-26.
85 Quick Answers to Public Funding Questions, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.
fec.gov/ans/answers_public_funding.shtml (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
86 BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 2, at 126.
87 Id. at 108.
88 Id. at 106.
89 The American Judicature Society is an independent and nonpartisan organization whose
stated mission is to “improve the justice system” and “secure and promote an independent
and qualified judiciary.” About AJS, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.ajs.org/ajs/ajs_
about.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
90 Jost, supra note 4, at 378 (suggesting that, even with a public financing scheme, indepen-
dent expenditure committees will ultimately find other means to financially support judicial
candidates).
91 Id. at 383.
92 BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 2, at 8-9.
93 Id. at 3 (Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Utah).
94 Jost, supra note 4, at 376.
95 BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 2, at 8.
96 Streb, supra note 21, at 11.
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on a disagreement with a controversial decision or the judge’s personal
philosophy.97
D. Current State of Campaign Spending in Judicial Elections
Nonpartisan elections, public financing, merit-based selection, and other
efforts to protect the judiciary from outside influence have failed to control the
one unavoidable reality of any election-based system—campaign contributions.
Empirical reviews of campaign spending in judicial elections indicate a nearly
700 percent increase in contributions to state supreme court judicial candidates
from 1989-2008,98 65 percent of which came from business interests and law-
yers in 2005-2006.99  Indeed, between 2000 and 2009, 537 judicial candidates
combined to raise more than $206 million, more than double the $83 million
judicial candidates raised during the 1990s.100  The American Bar Association,
Justice at Stake, the Brennan Center for Justice, and other public interest groups
have pushed for stricter recusal standards to counteract what they see as “nega-
tive effects on public confidence in the judiciary.”101  Supreme Court Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
have also expressed strong concern over the threat of campaign contributions to
the integrity of the judicial system.102
Although increasing campaign contributions to judicial candidates seems
alarming, studies fail to conclusively show that money is directly influencing
judicial decision-making.103  Many studies, although showing a statistically
significant link between campaign contributions and judicial decisions, fail to
show a directional component104 and have yet to conclusively establish, assum-
ing it is even possible to establish, that campaign contributions specifically
influence judicial decisions.105  Erwin Chemerinsky, the dean of University of
California, Irvine School of Law and preeminent constitutional scholar, has
97 Id.
98 Jost, supra note 4, at 377.
99 SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
2006, at 18 fig.11 (Jesse Rutledge ed., 2007) [hereinafter SAMPLE ET AL. 2006], available at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/49c18b6cb18960b2f9_z6m62gwji.pdf.
100 SAMPLE ET AL.,  BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELEC-
TIONS 2000-2009, at 6-7 fig.2, 8 (Charles Hall ed., 2010) [hereinafter SAMPLE ET AL. 2000-
2009], available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASNPJEDecadeONLINE_8E7
FD3FEB83E3.pdf; see also Matthew Mosk, Study Shows Money Flooding into Campaigns
for State Judgeships, ABC NEWS, Mar. 17, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/study-
shows-money-flooding-campaigns-state-judgeships/story?id=10120048&page=1.
101 See Jost, supra note 4, at 376-77. See generally SAMPLE ET AL. 2000-2009, supra note
100.
102 See Sandra Day O’Connor, Op-Ed., Justice for Sale, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at
A25; Mosk, supra note 100.
103 Damon Cann, Beyond Accountability and Independence: Judicial Selection and State
Court Performance, 90 JUDICATURE 226, 228 (2007); Madhavi M. McCall & Michael A.
McCall, Campaign Contributions, Judicial Decisions, and the Texas Supreme Court:
Assessing the Appearance of Impropriety, 90 JUDICATURE 214, 216 (2007).
104 Cann, supra note 103, at 228 (describing a Wisconsin Supreme Court study that showed
a link between attorney contributions and judges and the probability of winning the case);
McCall & McCall, supra note 103, at 216.
105 McCall & McCall, supra note 103, at 214.
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commented on the difficulty of ascertaining a cause-and-effect relationship
between contributions and decisions, noting that “[t]here is no way to prove the
extent to which contributions and spending actually affect judicial decision-
making.”106  Some scholars say that it is more likely that many—if not most—
contributions are made to judicial candidates for the sole purpose of supporting
a like-minded individual.107
However, one recent study of the partisan election states of Michigan and
Texas finds evidence of a “quid pro quo relationship” between contributors and
judicial decisions.108  Considering other studies show that partisan elections
generally involve higher levels of spending,109 this finding is not surprising.
The lack of current empirical certainty in the relationship between contri-
butions and judicial decision-making, though, should not deter potential reform.
Irrespective of whether contributions actually influence decisions, supporters of
judicial reform emphasize that the more pressing concern involves the public
perception of judges—that is “people think judges are [being] influenced” by
campaign contributions.110  Indeed, public confidence in the judiciary is eroded
when people believe a judge is unable or unwilling to divorce himself from
personal bias in court proceedings.111  As the judicial system loses the public’s
trust, it becomes more difficult to provide stability and order.112  This doubt
also creates a chilling effect, deterring weaker parties from pursuing legal
action, which, in turn, undermines the legal system.113  Even some of the most
stalwart critics of reform agree that the perception of bias created by excessive
campaign contributions can pose a threat to due process in some situations.114
III. THE EXTREME CASE OF CAPERTON V. MASSEY
The modern reality of excessive campaign contributions came to a head in
West Virginia during the 1990s.115  In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Com-
pany, the United States Supreme Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“Supreme Court of West Virginia”) Chief
Justice Brent Benjamin’s failure to recuse himself after receiving more than $3
million in campaign support from A.T. Massey Chief Executive Officer Don
106 Id.
107 See Cann, supra note 103, at 228 (citing congressional election studies that disprove the
myth that ideological groups are attempting to “buy the votes of legislators”).
108 Chris W. Bonneau & Damon M. Cann, The Effect of Campaign Contributions on Judi-
cial Decisionmaking 19 (Feb. 4, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1337668.
109 Chris W. Bonneau, The Dynamics of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elec-
tions, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL AND LEGAL STAKES OF
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 21, at 59, 64.
110 Id. at 61; see also Biskupic, supra note 1.
111 Cravens, supra note 63, at 11.
112 Id. at 11-12.
113 Id. at 12.
114 Meiser, supra note 25, at 1833-34 (discussing the extreme case of Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009)).
115 Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown: Judicial Ethics After Caperton, 60 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 229, 230 (2010) (describing Caperton as “a poster boy for the bigger problem occa-
sioned by the role of large campaign expenditures in state judicial elections”).
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Blankenship constituted an unconstitutional “probability of bias” in violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.116  Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, described the story behind Caperton as an “extraordi-
nary situation” where intervention was required to preserve the due process of
law.117  To provide context for the modern movement toward more stringent
judicial disqualification standards, this section will (1) examine the unusual
facts behind Caperton and (2) discuss the “probability of bias” standard created
by that decision.
A. The Underlying Action
The story began in the early 1990s, when A.T. Massey Coal Company
(“A.T. Massey”), one of the nation’s largest coal companies, sought to
purchase LTV Steel (“LTV”).118  However, LTV refused to purchase Massey’s
“inferior . . . quality” coal, instead acquiring it from the Harman Mine in Vir-
ginia, which was owned by the petitioner, Hugh Caperton.119  Wellmore Coal
Corporation (“Wellmore”) was the sole purchaser of coal from Harman Mine,
and LTV purchased Wellmore’s coal.120  In an effort to secure LTV’s business,
Massey purchased Wellmore, but LTV again refused to purchase coal from
Massey.121  In response, Massey invoked the force majeure clause in
Wellmore’s contract with Caperton, ending all coal purchases from Harman
Mine.122  The trial court found that Massey intentionally “delayed Wellmore’s
termination of [the] contract until late in the year, knowing it would be virtually
impossible for [Caperton] to find alternate buyers.”123  “Massey simultaneously
entered into negotiations . . . to purchase the Harman Mine.”124  During negoti-
ations, Massey obtained confidential information that it later used to decrease
the value of the Harman Mine.125  Massey’s actions left Caperton without a
purchaser or mining operations, effectively forcing his company into
bankruptcy.126
In 1998, Caperton sued Massey in a West Virginia court alleging tortious
interference with existing contractual relations, fraudulent misrepresentation,
and fraudulent concealment.127  In late 2002, a jury returned a verdict of $50
million for Caperton.128  Over the next four years, Massey filed several post-
116 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263-64 (2009).
117 Id. at 2265.
118 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2008 WL
2676568.
119 Id. at 3-4.
120 Id. at 4.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. (first alteration in original).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 4-5.
127 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
128 Id.
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trial motions before eventually appealing the decision to the Supreme Court of
West Virginia in 2006.129
In 2004, between the verdict and the appeal, Justice Warren McGraw
sought re-election to the Supreme Court of West Virginia.130  Massey’s CEO,
Don Blankenship, donated the statutory maximum of $1,000 to Justice
McGraw’s opposing candidate, Brent Benjamin.131  Blakenship also helped to
create a 527 group,132 “And for the Sake of the Kids,” through which he
donated nearly $2.5 million on Benjamin’s behalf.133  Blankenship spent
another $500,000 to purchase anti-McGraw television and newspaper adver-
tisements as well as direct mailings to solicit donations for Benjamin.134
Blankenship’s combined $3 million in campaign support was more than “the
total amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters and three times the amount
spent by Benjamin’s own committee,”135 the largest individual contribution in
any judicial election in 2004,136 and the second largest contribution between
2000 and 2009.137  Notably, of the top fifty-five contributors to judicial candi-
dates during the period from 2000 to 2009, Don Blakenship was the only indi-
vidual.138  With Blankenship’s support, Benjamin won the election with more
than 53 percent of the vote.139
In October 2005, Caperton requested the disqualification of Benjamin on
grounds that Blankenship’s exorbitant financial support of Benjamin’s cam-
paign created an appearance of impropriety in violation of the Due Process
Clause.140  Benjamin refused, stating that there was “no objective information
. . . to show that [he] ha[d] prejudged the matters which comprise[d] th[e]
litigation, or that [he would] be anything but fair and impartial.”141  In Novem-
ber 2007, the court reversed the $50 million judgment against Massey in a 3-2
decision in which Justice Benjamin joined the majority.142
Caperton subsequently sought rehearing, again seeking the disqualification
of Benjamin for the previous campaign support he received and also the dis-
129 Id. (describing Massey’s efforts in attacking the verdict and damages award); see, e.g.,
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 98-C-192, 2005 WL 5679073 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Mar.
15, 2005).
130 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
131 Id.
132 A “527 group” is a tax-exempt organization named after the section of the U.S. tax code
that led to their creation.  Generally, 527 groups are unregulated, non-profit organizations
that are required by law to advocate for particular issues rather than the direct support or
defeat of a candidate in order to maintain their tax-exempt status. See generally 26 U.S.C.
§ 527 (2006).
133 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 See RACHEL WEISS, INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, FRINGE TACTICS: SPECIAL
INTEREST GROUPS TARGET JUDICIAL RACES 5 (2005), available at http://www.policyarchive.
org/handle/10207/bitstreams/6027.pdf.
137 SAMPLE ET AL. 2000-2009, supra note 100, at 10-11 fig.4.
138 Id. at 9.
139 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 2258.
142 Id.
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qualification of Chief Justice Maynard for an unrelated matter.143  Maynard
recused himself, but Benjamin declined to follow suit,144 despite strong disap-
proval.145  In his recusal memorandum, Justice Starcher, stated that “Blanken-
ship’s bestowal of his personal wealth, political tactics, and ‘friendship’ have
created a cancer in the affairs of this Court.”146  The court accepted the rehear-
ing, and then Chief Justice Benjamin rejected yet another motion for disqualifi-
cation.147  In April 2008, the court again voted 3-2, reversing the trial court’s
ruling amid strongly worded dissents.148  Benjamin’s concurring opinion con-
tained a 44-page explanation of his refusal to recuse himself in which he
rejected the “appearance of impropriety” standard as a basis for
disqualification.149
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari150 and, in June 2009,
reversed by a 5-4 majority.  It vacated and remanded the Supreme Court of
West Virginia’s decision, which had reversed Capterton’s $50 million judg-
ment.151  In September 2009, the Supreme Court of West Virginia re-heard the
case.152  Circuit Judge James Holiday replaced Justice Benjamin in accordance
with the United States Supreme Court’s decision that Benjamin should have
been disqualified in the initial hearing of Caperton before the Supreme Court of
West Virginia.153  On November 12, 2009, the West Virginia Supreme Court
once again decided in favor of Massey.154  Finally, on March 11, 2010, the
Supreme Court of West Virginia rejected requests by Caperton to reconsider its
decision.155
B. “Probability of Bias” Standard Articulated in Caperton
The United States Supreme Court held that Blankenship’s substantial cam-
paign support while Caperton’s rehearing was pending violated the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it created a serious risk that
Justice Benjamin would not be an impartial adjudicator in that case.156  Recog-
nizing that not every campaign contribution to a judge creates a “probability of
143 A photograph revealed Chief Justice Maynard dining with Blankenship in the French
Riviera. Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 2258-59 (noting “genuine due process implications” due to Justice Benjamin’s
refusal to recuse himself).
149 Id. at 2258 (alteration in original) (quoting Joint Appendix at 336a-37a, Caperton, 129
S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22)).
150 Id. at 2259.
151 Id. at 2263-64.
152 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 333 (W. Va. 2009).
153 Id. at 333 n.26.
154 Id. at 357.
155 John O’Brien, W. Va. SC Won’t Rehear Controversial $50M Case, LEGALNEWSLINE.
COM (March 11, 2010, 1:00 PM), http://www.legalnewsline.com/news/226057-w.va.-sc-
wont-rehear-controversial-50m-case.  Upon receiving the final order, Hugh Caperton causti-
cally said, “I guess Don and Spike and Robin and Brent won.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
156 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263-64.
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bias” requiring recusal, the Court noted the high likelihood of “actual bias” that
occurs when an individual with a personal relationship to a case disproportion-
ately supports a judge’s campaign.157
Although the Court had not previously found due process to require
recusal in situations involving substantial campaign support, the Caperton deci-
sion is consistent with the common-law rule and modern precedent that applied
the Due Process Clause in cases involving judicial disqualification.158  As early
as 1927, the Supreme Court had held that the Due Process Clause incorporated
the common law rule that requires recusal when a judge has a “direct, personal,
substantial pecuniary interest” in a case before him or her.159  This rule not
only protects against direct financial interest in the outcome of a case, but also
requires recusal when “the interest [is] less than what would have been consid-
ered personal or direct at common law.”160  Indeed, the Court’s concern shifted
from merely direct pecuniary interests to avoiding any interests that might
tempt judges to disregard neutrality in hearing cases161 or create an unconstitu-
tional potential for bias.162
The Court held that a party does not need to show actual bias to violate the
Due Process Clause.  In numerous opinions, Benjamin insisted that Caperton
merely provided subjective evidence of bias, claiming that there was no “actual
conduct . . . that could be [viewed] as ‘improper’” by a sitting judge.163  How-
ever, the Court intentionally passed on answering the question of “actual bias”
in Caperton, instead emphasizing the objective principles embodied in the Due
Process Clause with respect to recusal determination.164  It avoided declaring
that campaign contributions actually influenced Benjamin’s decision, by rely-
ing on a more objective standard: whether the contributions “‘would offer a
possible temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true.’”165  The Court found that Blankenship’s role in
Justice Benjamin’s reelection failed the objective test required to pass constitu-
tional muster.166  The majority took pains to emphasize the extraordinary
nature of the Caperton situation,167 underscoring the unusual timing of the
campaign contributions in relation to the justice’s election and the pendency of
the case.168
157 Id. (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
158 See id. at 2259-63 (discussing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986);
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Ward v.
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); and Tumey,
273 U.S. 510).
159 Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523.
160 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259-60.
161 Id. at 2260.
162 Id. at 2262.
163 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
164 Id. at 2263 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986); Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465-66 (1971); and Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532).
165 Id. at 2264 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532).
166 Id. at 2264-65.
167 Id. at 2265.
168 Id. at 2264-65.
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Unfortunately, the “probability of bias” standard articulated in Caperton
does not constitute a bright-line rule for judicial disqualification based on cam-
paign contributions.  Rather, the Court “set a floor” through the promulgation
of several flexible factors, which in turn assist in determining whether a due
process violation has occurred.169  The Court articulated three guiding factors
in determining whether a contributor’s support is sufficient to create a
probability of bias that requires recusal: (1) “the contribution’s relative size in
comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the campaign,” (2) “the
total amount spent in the election,” and (3) “the apparent effect such contribu-
tion had on the outcome of the election.”170  Additionally, the Conference of
Chief Justices recommended several balancing factors in its amicus curiae
brief—including the nature of the supporter’s prior political activities, the
nature of the supporter’s pre-existing relationship with the judge, and the rela-
tionship between the supporter and the litigant—for evaluating due process
concerns caused by excessive contributions to judicial candidates.171
C. The Dissenters’ Unrealized Fears in Caperton
Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito),
wrote the dissenting opinion in Caperton.172  The dissenters rejected the
probability of bias standard on the grounds that it is too difficult to define.173
Using a unique dissent format, Chief Justice Roberts posed forty questions,
comprised of numerous sub-parts, testing the practical application of the major-
ity’s use of the Due Process Clause to mandate disqualification when a judge
has received substantial and disproportionate campaign contributions from a
party appearing before that judge in a case.174  The dissent appeared “to have a
dramatically different view of human nature” and the potential risk that a judge
could be influenced by substantial campaign contributions.175  Many of Chief
Justice Roberts’s questions emphasized the ambiguity involved in creating a
threshold amount that triggered a probability of bias and the mechanics
involved in making such a rule operational.176  However, recent attempts at
creating a disqualification rule based on contributions show that these questions
can be adequately addressed.
For the first time, the United States Supreme Court found due process to
require recusal based on election campaign support.177  Understandably, Justice
Roberts expressed trepidation about the potential for a flood of certiorari peti-
169 James Sample, Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV.
293, 296 (2010).
170 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264.
171 Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party
at 24-29, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 45973.
172 See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
173 Id.
174 See id. at 2269-72.
175 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Playing Forty Questions: Responding to Justice Roberts’s Concerns
in Caperton and Some Tentative Answers About Operationalizing Judicial Recusal and Due
Process, 39 SW. L. REV. 1, 27 (2009).
176 See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269-72 (Robert, C.J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 2263-64 (majority opinion)
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tions alleging failure to recuse in violation of due process.178  However, as of
April 2010, “only twenty-six cases had conducted an in-depth analysis of
Caperton, while thirty-three” had briefly mentioned the decision.179  As Justice
Kennedy noted, because states are permitted to have stricter recusal standards
than due process requires, states will be able to resolve most recusal disputes
without resorting to application of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.180  Therefore, states should be encouraged to adopt recusal standards that
are appropriate for their respective election and judicial systems.
IV. CRITIQUE OF RECENT STATE PROPOSALS FOR STRICTER
DISQUALIFICATION RULES BASED ON CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
Since the Supreme Court’s Caperton decision in early 2009, many states
have considered revising their judicial codes to include language that reflects
Model Code 2.11(A)(4).181  Rule 2.11(A)(4) is the controversial provision
requiring recusal when a judge “knows or learns by means of a timely motion
that a party, a party’s lawyer, or the law firm of a party’s lawyer” has contrib-
uted an amount of money (to be determined by the state) to his or her cam-
paign.182  States should take into account the factors articulated by Justice
Kennedy in Caperton, and the additional considerations listed by the Confer-
ence of Chief Justices in its amicus brief, as they debate and propose new legis-
lation and judicial conduct codes that address potential due process violations
caused by disproportionate campaign support for judges.  These factors—the
contribution’s relative size in comparison to the total amount of money contrib-
uted to the judge’s campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the
apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election—help to
ensure the creation of a disqualification rule that takes into account the com-
plexity of judicial elections.183  It is against these factors and other practical
considerations that recent state proposals are critiqued throughout this section.
At least eleven states are considering adoption of Rule 2.11(A) or a varia-
tion thereof in the wake of the Caperton decision.184  Eight of these states have
proposed plans placing a monetary cap on contributions to a judicial candidate
that would trigger mandatory disqualification.185  Of those, five states—Cali-
178 See id. at 2267 (Robert, C.J., dissenting).
179 Catherine Stone & Wendy Martinez, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.: The Texas
Implications, 41 ST. MARY’S L.J. 621, 634 (2010).
180 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (“‘Judicial integrity is, in consequence, a state interest of
the highest order.’”) (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
181 See generally John Gibeaut, Caperton Capers: Court’s Recusal Ruling Sparks States to
Mull Judicial Contribution Laws, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2009, at 21.
182 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(4) (2007).
183 See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
184 Recusal Reform in the States After Caperton v. Massey, supra note 7 (outlining recent
proposals, initiatives, and hearings in California, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Montana, North Carolina, Nevada, New York, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin regarding
modifications to their respective model judicial codes).
185 Id. (California, Montana, Nevada, Texas, Washington, and two proposals in Wisconsin);
Special Edition: Judicial Recusal Legislation, supra note 11, at 5, 7 (Louisiana).
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fornia, Montana, Texas, Wisconsin,186 New York,187 and Louisiana188—have
considered contribution caps at or below $1,500, and three states—Nevada,
Washington, and Wisconsin—have contemplated proposals that seek signifi-
cantly higher thresholds for disqualification.189  California has a relatively low
threshold, while Nevada has a relatively high threshold.  Although the details of
each proposal are unique to the respective state, a categorical analysis reveals
potential advantages and concerns that are common across the various
approaches.
A. California’s Low Disqualification Threshold Proposal: A Strict
Application of Caperton
California’s proposal emphasizes a strict and transparent approach to judi-
cial disqualification based on campaign contributions,190 reaching beyond the
scope of the due process requirements discussed in Caperton.191  The impor-
tant question is whether California’s proposal effectively balances judicial
independence with the preventative factors articulated in Caperton.
In August 2009, the Judicial Council of California, the policymaking body
of the California court system, concluded that mandatory disqualification and
disclosure would adequately address the concerns involving the effect of cam-
paign contributions on actual or perceived judicial impartiality.192  The Council
proposed that trial and appellate court judges193 would be disqualified if they
received at least $1,500 in campaign contributions from a party, counsel, or
other interested party in a hearing before the judge in the two years following
receipt of the contribution.194  Furthermore, the Council—recognizing that
inflation and increased campaign spending could make the $1,500 limit ineffec-
186 The League of Women voters plan would have required recusal when a party to a case
contributed $1,000. In re Creation of Rules for Recusal When a Party or Lawyer in a Case
Made Contribution Effecting a Judicial Campaign at 3, In re Amendment of the Code of
Judicial Conduct’s Rules on Recusal (Wis. July 7, 2010) (08-16), available at http://www.
wicourts.gov/supreme/docs/0816petition.pdf.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the
petition. In re Amendment of the Code of Judicial Conduct’s Rules on Recusal, supra, at 2,
available at http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/rulhear/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo
=51874.
187 The proposed bill would require parties and their lawyers to disclose to opposing coun-
sel campaign contributions in excess of $500 for the past five years to the campaign of the
presiding judge. Recusal Reform in the States After Caperton v. Massey, supra note 7.  If
other side has made no contribution themselves, the judge must recuse upon timely applica-
tion by the non-contributing party. Id.
188 The proposed—but unadopted—bill would have required automatic recusal if judge
knew or learned by a timely motion that a party, party’s counsel or law firm, or any person
within the third degree of relationship to them had made any contribution to his or her
campaign in the past five years.  H.R. 769, 2008 Leg., 34th Session (La. 2008).
189 See Recusal Reform in the States After Caperton v. Massey, supra note 7.
190 See generally CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.1(a)(9) (West 2006); see also COMM’N FOR
IMPARTIAL COURTS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., FINAL REPORT 33 (2009), available at http:/
/www.courts.ca.gov/xbcr/cc/cicfinalreport.pdf.
191 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009).
192 COMM’N FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS, supra note 190, at 33.
193 See id. at 43 (discussing the impracticability of also requiring Supreme Court justices to
adhere to the same $1,500 limit).
194 Id. at 35.
834 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:815
tive in the future—recommended a regular review and adjustment of the thresh-
old amount.195  The Council also recommended a higher threshold of $25,900
for Supreme Court justices due to the large amounts of campaign spending at
that level.196
Additionally, in an attempt to prevent unscrupulous parties or lawyers that
may try to “game” the proposed system, the Council decided on two protective
measures: (1) a provision allowing the noncontributing party to waive
mandatory disqualification, and (2) a requirement that disqualification still be
mandatory if a judge knows or reasonably should know that multiple individual
contributions, in the aggregate, reach the $1,500 threshold and are all affiliated
with the same entity.197  The waiver provision would typically apply when a
party tries to intentionally disqualify a judge by contributing to the judge’s
election campaign.  This situation might occur if a party feels that the judge
will be less favorable to that party’s case.  If the noncontributing party suspects
foul play, the party can invoke the waiver to ensure the judge hears its case.
In August 2010, the California State Legislature passed, and Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger subsequently signed, Assembly Bill 2487, which
closely follows the Council’s proposed disqualification language.198  California
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1(9), the enacted law, requires a judge to
disqualify himself or herself from any matter in which a lawyer or party con-
tributed more than $1,500 to the judge’s upcoming election campaign or last
election, if the last election took place within the previous six years.199  CCP
§ 170.1(9) also provides for the possibility of a waiver from the non-contribut-
ing party and mandatory disclosure of all contributions, regardless of size, from
any party or lawyer appearing before the judge.200  Notably, unlike the Coun-
cil’s proposal, the disqualification law only applies to superior court (trial)
judges, extends the disqualification time period from two to six years, and fails
to include a provision mandating disqualification when aggregate individual
contributions reach the $1,500 threshold through a single entity.201  Because
section 170.1(9) was largely based on the Council’s recommendations, and—as
of April 2011—there does not appear to be any pending litigation or press
surrounding the recently enacted law, this section will primarily focus on the
Council’s proposal.
The Judicial Council first considered and then dismissed the idea of
imposing strict contribution limits that parties could actually contribute.202  It
instead focused on the effect that contributions could have or appear to have on
195 Id.
196 Id. at 44 (noting the Commission’s recommendation that the “disqualification threshold
amount for Supreme Court justices should be the same as the contribution limit amount
applicable to candidates for Governor.”).  At the time the report was written, the individual
contribution limit for the governor was $25,900. California Contribution Limits, CAL. SEC-
RETARY ST. (Oct. 2008), http://www.sos.ca.gov/prd/FACTS.pdfhttp://www.sos.ca.gov/prd/
FACTS.pdfhttp://www.sos.ca.gov/prd/FACTS.pdf.
197 COMM’N FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS, supra note 190, at 41.
198 Assemb. 2487, 2009-10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010).
199 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.1(a)(9) (West 2006).
200 See id. § 170.1(a)(9)(C)-(D).
201 See id. § 170.1(a)(9).
202 Id. at 33.
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judicial decisions.203  The Council decided that a fixed threshold amount, rather
than a percentage of total contributions, would best provide an objective stan-
dard for disqualification.204  They arrived at this figure by equating “campaign
support” with “financial interest,” a classification that is currently subject to a
$1,500 statutory limit under section 170.1.205  The Council also stressed that
this new provision would merely supplement the current requirements outlined
in section 170.1, which may require disqualification in circumstances involving
less than $1,500.206  The Council gave deference to this previous legislative
determination, explaining that California lawmakers already found $1,500 to be
“meaningful with respect to a judge’s ability to be impartial, or at least to give
the appearance of impartiality.”207  Additionally, it consulted a database con-
sisting of six years of campaign disclosure information, which showed a “rela-
tively low number” of contributions above $1,500.208  This data—along with
statutory definition of a “de minimis economic interest in a party” outlined in
section 170.1209—supported the inference that $1,500 would not inhibit poten-
tial contributors nor impede the ability of judicial candidates to fundraise.210
1. Notable Omissions and Assumptions of the California Proposal
The Council glazed over several important considerations regarding judi-
cial disqualification based on campaign contributions.  First, the Council did
not articulate sufficient reasons for its choice not to use a percentage of the
candidate’s total campaign support as the threshold requirement.211  Second, it
decided not to recommend a threshold amount of contributions made to an
independent expenditure committee that would also trigger automatic disquali-
fication.212  Finally, it failed to address concerns of judicial independence, a
traditional challenge to reform.
The Council quickly dismissed the alternative method of percentage-based
recusal based on aggregate campaign contributions to judicial candidates.  With
respect to its rationale for the $1,500 threshold amount, the Council merely
stated that it “determined that a uniform, fixed amount would be the most effi-
cient and effective solution.”213  The Council qualified its preference for a set
figure for disqualification by pointing to a previous legislative determination
that defined the amount at which a judge has a “financial interest”; however, it
203 Id. at 33; see generally CAL. FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM’N, INDEPENDENT
EXPENDITURES: THE GIANT GORILLA IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2008), available at http://
www.fppc.ca.gov/ie/IEReport2.pdf (reporting on data that shows the ineffectiveness of con-
tribution caps on limiting overall spending).
204 COMM’N FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS, supra note 190, at 40.
205 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.5(b) (West 2006).
206 See id. § 170.1(a)(6)(A).
207 COMM’N FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS, supra note 190, at 40.
208 Id. at 40 n.35.
209 JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION PROJECT, supra note 10, at 26.
210 Id.
211 COMM’N FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS, supra note 190, at 40.
212 Timm Herdt, Herdt: When Is Justice for Sale? Court Ruling Comes as California
Ponders Its Rules, VENTURA COUNTY STAR (June 10, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.vcstar.
com/news/2009/jun/10/when-is-justice-for-sale.
213 COMM’N FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS, supra note 190, at 40.
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immediately dismissed the relative benefits of using a percentage-based
requirement.214  Notably, a percentage-based requirement would better account
for substantial contributions made in less expensive judicial races.215
Additionally, the evidence relied upon by the Council to determine the
$1,500 threshold utilized flawed empirical data that failed to reflect the vari-
ance in contribution amounts based on county population.216  Notably, the con-
tribution data was taken solely from judicial races in some of the most-
populous counties in the state: Alameda, Orange, Los Angeles, and Sacra-
mento.217  The study cited by the Council showed a relatively low number of
contributions exceeding $1,500 in the aforementioned counties.218  However, a
smaller donation could drastically impact the outcome of a less expensive judi-
cial race, such that might occur in a county with a smaller population.
The Council felt it more appropriate to err on the side of “statewide uni-
formity”219 by tying the current statutory requirement for disqualification based
on financial interest220 to the proposed threshold amount.  However, the set
threshold amount fails to take into account the possibility that a single party
could greatly influence the outcome of a less-expensive judicial race with a
contribution just slightly below the $1,500 limit.  The Council considers $1,500
the point at which a probability of bias is created in a more expensive judicial
race; however, less expensive judicial races may require a much smaller figure
to avoid a probability of bias.  By utilizing a percentage-based model—or at
least lowering the disqualification threshold for less populous counties, where
there are generally fewer expensive judicial races—California might be able to
avoid this potential issue.  Fortunately, the Council, recognizing the need for an
escape hatch if a contributor(s) attempted to force disqualification of a judge,
recommended the option of a waiver of mandatory disqualification by the non-
contributing party.221  Another alternative would have been to trigger
mandatory review of challenged disqualifications in less-populous counties.222
Additionally, the Council failed to adequately reconcile stricter recusal
standards with the rise of constitutionally protected independent expendi-
tures.223  Recent studies have shown a significant increase in the amount of
independent expenditures in judicial elections in the United States, albeit
214 Id.
215 See discussion infra Part IV.B.1 (noting the advantages of Nevada’s percentage-based
requirement).
216 COMM’N FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS, supra note 190, at 40 n.35.
217 Id.; see also Geographic Comparison Table of Race and Ethnicity in California Coun-
ties, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=n&_lang=
en&mt_name=DEC_2000_PL_U_GCTPL_ST2&format=st-2&_box_head_nbr=GCT-PL&
ds_name=DEC_2000_PL_U&geo_id=04000US06 (last visited Apr. 18, 2011) (showing
total populations of California counties).
218 COMM’N FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS, supra note 190, at 40 n.35.
219 Id. attachment C, at 69 (responding to a public comment concerning the threshold
amounts based on county population).
220 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.5(b) (2009).
221 COMM’N FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS, supra note 190, at 41; This provision was also
included in the enacted law. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.1(a)(9)(D) (West 2006)
222 See, e.g., infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing Nevada’s use of a percentage-based trigger).
223 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45-51 (1976).
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mostly at the state supreme court level.224  The $1,500 limit proposed by the
Council would not require recusal if a contributor made independent expendi-
tures in support of a judicial candidate.225
Admittedly, there is a valid concern that stricter recusal standards for inde-
pendent expenditures might “penalize campaign activity,” thereby limiting con-
stitutionally protected political speech.226  In Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, a 2010 case in which the United States Supreme Court
held that corporations and labor unions could make independent expenditures
in support of or against political candidates, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, emphasized that Caperton did not involve a restriction on political
speech.227  Indeed, a restraint on government in the form of mandatory judicial
disqualification does not necessarily equate to a free speech restriction on a
private actor in the form of limits on independent expenditures.  The Council’s
failure to confront independent expenditures head-on sidesteps the most troub-
ling aspect of Caperton—Don Blankenship contributed nearly $2.5 million to
Justice Benjamin’s campaign through “And for the Sake of the Kids,” an inde-
pendent expenditure committee.228  Justice Kennedy explicitly agreed that
these independent expenditures left Benjamin “feel[ing] a debt of gratitude to
Blankenship for his extraordinary efforts to get him elected.”229  The Council
cited a study concluding that contribution caps encourage spending by indepen-
dent expenditure groups230 and yet failed to adequately address a predictable
rise in that same sort of spending caused by individuals and entities attempting
to avoid the Council’s proposed mandatory disqualification threshold.
Finally, the Council failed to address traditional concerns of judicial inde-
pendence.  Requiring recusal based on specified contributions levels tests the
delicate “balance between allowing judges their due independence, and limiting
that freedom in order to ensure impartiality.”231  Some critics of recusal reform
believe that “[i]mpartiality is fundamentally an unapproachable question . . .
that . . . only the individual judge can answer”232 and advocate a “restrained
due process” right to address unique recusal situations.233  They believe that
recusal primarily consists of a delicate balance between fairness, protecting
judicial independence and discretion, and limiting that freedom in only the
most extreme of situations to ensure impartiality.234  The critics stress the diffi-
culty of keeping this balance at equilibrium merely through a common law
224 See generally SAMPLE ET AL. 2000-2009, supra note 100.
225 COMM’N FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS, supra note 190, at 43 (noting that such an expenditure
“could possibly be considered an indirect contribution or could trigger [permissive] disquali-
fication . . . under the Code of Judicial Ethics”).
226 Bopp & Woudenberg, supra note 75, at 333 (discussing the potential due process ramifi-
cations created by strict recusal standards); Richard M. Esenberg, If You Speak up, Must You
Stand Down: Caperton and Its Limits, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1287, 1325 (2010).
227 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010).
228 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009).
229 Id. at 2262.
230 COMM’N FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS, supra note 190, at 33 (citing CAL. FAIR POLITICAL
PRACTICES COMM’N., supra note 200).
231 Meiser, supra note 25, at 1826.
232 Id. at 1822-23.
233 Id. at 1834.
234 Id. at 1826-27.
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standard or bright-line rule.235  Moreover, many judges aspire to “ensure[ ] the
greatest possible public confidence in their independence, impartiality, integrity
and competence.”236
The Council, while thorough in its report, failed to give an estimate of the
number of judges that would be forced to recuse themselves due to the $1,500
limit.  Forced recusal, at its heart, is an affront to the independence that has
been traditionally afforded to judges to make their own decisions as to imparti-
ality.  The Council’s concerns seemed to be directed toward protecting the First
Amendment rights of contributors rather than the risk posed to judicial
independence.
B. Nevada’s High Disqualification Threshold Proposal: A Balanced
Approach to Caperton
Nevada’s failed approach237 to disqualification reform adequately
addressed the growing concern over rising contributions and independent
expenditures; however, a few questions remain as to the ramifications of its
implementation.  This section will evaluate the Nevada proposal: first, by
briefly describing the details of the amendment; second, by critiquing the
mandatory threshold amount; third, by analyzing the percentage-based trigger
for recusal; fourth, by identifying the need for a multiple election exception;
finally, by pointing out the lack of supporting empirical data.
In response to the Caperton decision, the Commission on the Amendment
to the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct (the Commission) proposed to amend
the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A).238  The proposed amend-
ment utilized a two-tiered approach to disqualification: (1) mandating recusal
based on high-figure campaign contributions; and (2) creating a separate, per-
centage-based threshold that triggers additional analysis of the judge’s potential
impartiality.239  The eighteen-member commission represented a “broad philo-
sophical spectrum”240 consisting of judges, professors, and other lawyers in
Nevada.241  Surprisingly, this diverse group of individuals unanimously
approved the Commission’s recommendation to adopt the mandatory disquali-
fication language.242  However, on December 17, 2009, the Nevada Supreme
Court voted to amend its Code of Judicial Conduct without the proposed dis-
qualification language.243  Despite unanimous approval by the Commission,
235 Id. at 1822-24.
236 Id. at 1824-25 (quoting the preamble of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and several
judges who are confident in their ability to uphold those ideals).
237 See generally Supplement to Final Report Dated April 1, 2009, In re Amendment to the
Nev. Code of Judicial Conduct, ADKT No. 427 (Nev. Aug. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Nevada
Proposed Code].
238 Id. at 1.
239 Id. at 2-4.
240 Jane Ann Morrison, Judge’s Duty to Sit Still Knows No Contribution Limits, LAS VEGAS
REV. J., Jan. 11, 2010, at 1B.
241 Nevada Judicial Conduct Code Commission Members, NEV. JUDICIARY, www.nevada
judiciary.us/index.php/njcccommissionmembers (last updated Feb. 27, 2009).
242 Morrison, supra note 237.
243 Order, In re Amendment of the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, ADKT 427, at 22
(Nev. Dec. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Nevada Adopted Code].
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Nevada Supreme Court Justice James Hardesty likened the proposed recom-
mendation to “killing a fly with a sledgehammer.”244  Under 2.11(A)(4), the
section where language pertaining to campaign contributions is located under
the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, the court inserted the word
“[Reserved].”245  Although Justice Hardesty noted that the court’s lack of
action did not preclude future monitoring of contributions to judicial candi-
dates,246 it is unclear whether the court intends to add disqualification language
in the future.
The proposed—but unadopted—amendment required the recusal of a
judge if a “party, or a party’s affiliated entities or constituents, or a party’s
lawyer or the law firm of a party’s lawyer” had contributed $50,000 in “finan-
cial or electoral campaign support” within the previous six years.247  This dis-
qualification was based on the presumption that $50,000 in financial support
over a period of six years would conclusively give reason to question a judge’s
impartiality to hear a case involving that individual or related entity.248  Addi-
tionally, the amendment provided that a judge would be subject to disqualifica-
tion if he or she received “aggregate campaign support exceeding [five percent]
of the judge’s total financial or electoral backing within the previous [six]
years.”249  But, rather than immediately disqualifying the judge, this provision
would merely subject the controversy in question to the eight factors listed in
Rule 2.11(A)(4)(E) to determine whether it would be reasonable to question the
judge’s impartiality.250
1. A Missed Opportunity for Reform
The Commission’s proposed rule addressed many of the technical issues
that arise in implementing a disqualification standard based on campaign con-
tributions.  First, the proposal avoids the controversial approach of tying dis-
qualification to the statutory contribution limit.  By creating a higher threshold
over a span of years, the proposal would allow contributors to max out their
contributions to a judicial candidate over an election cycle without fear of
recusal if the contributor ever appears before the judge in a case.  Second, the
authors chose the phrase “campaign support” in an effort to prevent “bundling,”
a controversial practice that involves funneling campaign contributions and
other financial support through individuals in an organization or community.251
Under the language of “campaign support,” bundlers, and those contributing to
bundlers, would likely be more hesitant to donate to a particular judge if they
feared disqualification.  This would seemingly prevent situations where an
unscrupulous bundler requests preferential treatment from the judge in
244 Morrison, supra note 237.
245 Nevada Adopted Code, supra note 240, at 22.
246 Morrison, supra note 237 (“Just because the court didn’t act on it, doesn’t mean it
doesn’t have to be monitored.”).
247 Nevada Proposed Code, supra note 234, at 2.
248 Id. at 4.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 3.
251 See David Kihara, Panel Urges Trigger for Disqualification, LAS VEGAS REV. J., July
21, 2009, at 2B.
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exchange for bundling large sums of individual contributions and other cam-
paign support.252
The percentage-based trigger created by the proposed language in Rule
2.11(A)(4)(A) presents a unique method for determining whether campaign
support has cast a reasonable cloud of impropriety.  Rather than mandating
recusal at exactly 5 percent, the rule triggers an analysis under subsection E of
Rule 2.11, which reflects the factors articulated by the Conference of Chief
Justices in its amicus curiae brief in Caperton.253  Furthermore, by using a
percentage-based trigger, the rule takes into account less-expensive judicial
races where mandatory disqualification for accepting $50,000 in campaign sup-
port over a period of six years would rarely ever have any effect.  However, by
applying the eight factors in subsection E to determine disqualification under
these circumstances, the court runs the risk of a lengthy mini-trial to determine
whether there is a reasonable question as to the judge’s impartiality.
Another potential issue with the amendment is that it ignores judicial can-
didates that have to run for multiple elections within six years.  In Nevada,
Supreme Court justices254 and District Court judges255 are elected for six-year
terms.  Therefore, judges that are appointed to a position on the higher court
before the end of their current term would be subject to two elections within the
proposed six-year period.  For example, Nevada Supreme Court Justice
Michael Douglas was first appointed to the Court in March 2004 from the
Eighth Judicial District Court after winning election for Chief District Judge in
October 2003.256  He has since run in two elections to retain his seat on the
Nevada Supreme Court.257  Due to this unique situation, Chief Justice Douglas
would have received more than the stated $50,000 maximum from a number of
donors.  This situation could be easily remedied by creating an exception that
utilizes a higher threshold figure for multiple elections within the same six-year
cycle.
Finally, the Commission failed to offer any empirical justification for
either the $50,000 figure or the 5 percent trigger.  Responding to a question
regarding the lack of empirical support for the chosen figures, Professor Jeffrey
Stempel, a Commission member and law professor at the University of Nevada
Las Vegas, explained that the Commission chose the figures based on an anec-
dotal review of studies and court cases on judicial disqualification.258  Profes-
sor Stempel further suggested that a “trial and error” approach through court
252 See, e.g., Adrienne Packer, Legal Ethics Expert Raises Concerns About Justice, LAS
VEGAS REV. J., May 23, 2009, at 1B (discussing an alleged quid pro quo offer by a local
attorney to Nevada Supreme Court Justice Pickering that would have provided her $200,000
in campaign contributions in exchange for recusal).
253 Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party,
supra note 171, at 24-29.
254 NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
255 Id. § 5.
256 John G. Edwards, New Business Judge Sees Need for Speedy Resolutions, LAS VEGAS
REV. J., Oct. 16, 2003, at 2D; Chief Justice Michael L. Douglas, NEVADA SUPREME COURT,
http://nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/justicedouglas/31 (last updated Feb. 17, 2011).
257 Chief Justice Michael Douglas, supra note 253.
258 Oral Argument at 54:40, Nevada Adopted Code, supra note 240 (on file with author).
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decisions would allow for future revisions to the figures if necessary.259  It is
impossible to predict every possible issue that might arise with any legislation;
however, the Commission should have at least performed a survey of Nevada
campaign contribution data to ensure that the threshold amounts would not
have resulted in a flood of unnecessary disqualifications.
Nevada’s proposal, despite the lack of an exception for multiple elections
and supporting empirical data, made a comprehensive attempt at disqualifica-
tion reform.  The proposal’s use of the term “campaign support” encompasses
contributions from parties, affiliated entities or constituents, a party’s lawyer or
law firm, and independent expenditure committees.260  By targeting bundling
and independent expenditure committees, the Commission succeeded in
addressing the primary issue in Caperton—accounting for contributions from
indirect sources.261  Additionally, Nevada’s innovative use of a percentage-
based trigger would have taken into account substantial contributions to judges
in less expensive races.  Although the recommended threshold of $50,000 may
ultimately prove ineffective at identifying and preventing the appearance of
impropriety, the Nevada Supreme Court missed an opportunity to implement
greatly needed reform in this area by implementing an otherwise largely effec-
tive rule.
C. Other Attempts at Statewide Implementation of Caperton
1. The High Costs of Caperton: Texas’s Rejection of Strict
Disqualification
In 2009, Texas legislators introduced a bill262 that would have required the
recusal of a justice of the supreme court or judge of the court of criminal
appeals if the judge had received campaign contributions in the preceding four
years totaling a mere $1,000 or more from a party, attorney, the attorney’s law
firm, or by an affiliated entity or committee created by an individual.263  With
such a low disqualification figure, it is unsurprising  that the Texas Legislative
Budget Board’s fiscal analysis of House Bill 4548 found that the proposed
provisions “would create a [fifty] percent recusal rate for supreme court
justices.”264
The Board estimated that the high recusal rate would result in an annual
cost of $1,144,926.265  The vast majority of the cost ($931,500) would stem
from travel expenses incurred by lower court judges who are commissioned by
the governor to hear cases in place of recused supreme court justices.266  The
remaining costs mostly stem from the salary and benefits for additional
259 Id. at 54:00.
260 Id. at 17:20 (Professor Jeffrey Stempel discussing how the reach of the proposed rule
goes beyond just the parties appearing before the judge).
261 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256-57 (2009).
262 H.B. 4548, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess., § 22.305(a)(1)(6) (Tex. 2009).
263 Id.
264 John S. O’Brien, Fiscal Note on H.B. 4548, TEX. LEGISLATURE ONLINE (Apr. 20, 2009),
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/81R/fiscalnotes/html/HB04548I.htm.
265 Id.
266 Id.
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supreme court staff attorneys.267  Likely based on the estimated costs, the bill
failed in committee in April 2009.268
Texas’s failed legislation presents a significant issue associated with
unnecessarily strict recusal limits: replacing disqualified judges.  A recusal rate
of 50 percent would have a drastic impact on the court system’s ability to
effectively ensure the proper administration of justice.  The Board’s finding
supports reform critics’ argument that stricter disqualification rules may “pre-
vent the best judge from hearing a case.”269  As more litigants seek to enforce
mandatory disqualification, court budgets will face an even heavier burden.270
Furthermore, parties’ litigation costs will increase as a result of relocation and
extended trials.271  Strict recusal standards like those proposed in Texas, partic-
ularly at the costly appellate and supreme court levels, could therefore “dispro-
portionately benefit the wealthiest parties.”272  On the other hand, setting the
threshold amount to such a low figure would better ensure that excessive cam-
paign contributions are not creating an appearance of impropriety.  But, courts
would need to implement a mechanism for quick and efficient replacement of
disqualified judges to reduce administrative costs for the courts and litigation
costs for the parties.273
However, one could argue the Legislative Budget Board’s methodology
was flawed and favored a higher annual cost projection.  The Board made sev-
eral assumptions about the travel costs for replacement judges.274  The Board
assumed that appellate and district court judges would need to travel to Austin
at least three times for hearings and conferences.275  Although this estimate
seems reasonable, it is not supported by any empirical data.  Additionally, the
Board estimated that each trip would cost $500 per trip for transportation, hotel,
and expenses.276  This cost may be appropriate for judges that must travel great
lengths for a hearing, but it does not factor in judges that are already within
close proximity of the Supreme Court or the reduced costs associated with
video and teleconferencing.
Cynics might view the Board’s potentially flawed finding as an attempt by
the Texas legislature to artificially inflate the costs of replacing disqualified
judges to preserve the financial freedom of judges in electoral campaigns.
Considering at least one recent study has found a “quid pro quo” relationship
267 Id.
268 History of H.B. 4548, TEX. LEGISLATURE ONLINE, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/Bill
Lookup/History.aspx?LegSess=81R&Bill=HB4548 (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
269 Meiser, supra note 25, at 1828-29.
270 See Geyh, supra note 65, at 41-43 (noting that any disqualification based on apparent
bias would eventually result in administrative burdens on the court); see also Randall T.
Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH-
ICS 1059, 1081-82 (1996) (describing the constraints imposed on court resources as judges
are “shuffled around” the state).
271 Meiser, supra note 25, at 1829.
272 Id.
273 SAMPLE ET AL., FAIR COURTS, supra note 42, at 33.
274 See O’Brien, supra note 261.
275 Id.
276 Id.
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between contributors and judges in Texas, this protectionist theory may be
more plausible than previously thought.277
2. Montana’s $250 Disqualification Proposal
In January 2009, Montana legislators drafted a bill278 that would have
required recusal of a Montana Supreme Court justice if he or she received a
campaign contribution in excess of $250, the statutory limit for contributions to
a justice,279 from a party or attorney appearing before that judge.280  Like the
California proposal, the Montana bill did not require disqualification in the
event that an independent expenditure committee donated to a justice’s cam-
paign in excess of the threshold amount.281  The bill died in the draft process
less than four months after its introduction.282
The Montana disqualification approach attempted to implement a thresh-
old amount without sufficiently addressing potential ramifications.  By tying
the contribution threshold amount for recusal to the statutory contribution limit,
Montana would have left the Supreme Court system open to potential attacks
through a simple loophole: parties and lawyers could simply donate one dollar
below the contribution limit to avoid mandatory disqualification when they
appear before that particular justice.  In addition, the Montana bill did not pro-
vide an optional waiver for the non-contributing party like that proposed by the
Judicial Council of California.283  The lack of such a waiver could result in
unscrupulous litigants contributing a meager $250 to an unwanted judge in
order to force their disqualification.
3. Washington’s Neglect of Bundled Contributions
In early 2008, the Washington State Supreme Court commissioned a task
force to review the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct to recommend
whether the Court should partially or fully adopt its provisions.284  In its rec-
ommendations, the task force included a proposed revision to Rule 2.11.285
The proposed Judicial Code of Conduct was open for public comment until
277 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
278 L.C. 2027, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2009) (bill draft), http://data.opi.mt.gov/bills/
2009/billpdf/LC2027.pdf.
279 MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-216(1)(a)(ii) (2009).
280 Mont. L.C. 2027 § 1.
281 See generally id.; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-216(1)(b) (defining “contribu-
tion” as “contributions made to the candidate’s committee and to any political committee
organized on the candidate’s behalf”).
282 Detailed Bill Information for L.C. 2027, MONT. LEGISLATURE, http://laws.leg.mt.gov/
laws09/law0203w$.startup (enter “LC2027” in “Bill Draft Number” and press “Find”) (last
visited Apr. 18, 2011) (bill died in draft process on April 28, 2009).
283 See COMM’N FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS, supra note 190, at 33 (discussing the need for a
waiver of disqualification to prevent a litigant from forcing recusal by making a large contri-
bution over the threshold amount).
284 SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, FINAL REPORT
(2009) [hereinafter WASH. FINAL REPORT] , http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/
Supreme%20Court%20Code%20of%20Judicial%20Conduct%20Task%20Force%20Com-
mitte/Final%20CJC%20%20Task%20Force%20Report%20Sept%2009.pdf.
285 Id.
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April 30, 2010.286  On September 9, 2010, the Washington State Supreme
Court adopted Rule 2.11(A) without the proposed disqualification language.287
Like Nevada, the court inserted “[Reserved]” under section (4).288
The proposed—but unadopted—rule provided for mandatory disqualifica-
tion of a judge if he or she learned that an “adverse party ha[d] provided finan-
cial support for any of [his or her] judicial election campaigns within the last
six years in an amount in excess of [ten] times the dollar amount of the cam-
paign contribution limit.”289  Because the current Washington State judicial
contribution limit is $1,400,290 a judge could only receive $14,000 in total
financial support within the past six years before automatic disqualification.
Additionally, the task force recommended optional disqualification if a party’s
support is “more than two times but less than [ten] times the contribution limit”
and the judge concludes that his or her impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned.291  The permissive disqualification option implies that even a relatively
small amount of financial support has the possibility of creating a reasonable
question as to the judge’s impartiality.  Furthermore, the proposal suggested
that the judge should make this determination by using the same factors articu-
lated by the majority in Caperton.
There are three main issues with Washington’s current proposal.  First,
Washington could face the same issues as Nevada when multiple elections
occur within one six-year election cycle.292  Second, $14,000 over six years
may be too low a figure to cover the financial support of both contributions and
independent expenditures.  Finally, Washington failed to include language that
broadens the scope of the rule to include individuals or groups affiliated with
parties that appear before the judge.  Indeed, it is unclear from the plain lan-
guage of the rule whether the lawyers for each party would also be subject to
the proposed rule or whether contributions from an attorney should be added to
those made by his or her client.
V. THE OVERARCHING NEED FOR GREATER TRANSPARENCY: MANDATING
FULL DISCLOSURE
Without a complementary expansion in campaign-finance disclosure
requirements, any of the aforementioned disqualification proposals would be
ineffective in achieving their primary goal: stymieing the influence of cam-
paign money in the judiciary.  In fact, the ABA Model Code urges judges to
disclose facts relevant to the question of disqualification; however, this provi-
286 See Recusal Reform in the States After Caperton v. Massey, supra note 7.
287 Order, In re Adoption of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, No. 25700-A-963, at 21
(Wash. Sept. 9, 2010).
288 Id.; Nevada Adopted Code, supra note 240, at 22.
289 WASH. FINAL REPORT, supra note 281.  Financial support is defined by the proposed
rules as campaign contributions or independent expenditures made in support of a judge’s
campaign or against the opposing candidate, including a portion of funds given to political
action committees that support the judge’s candidacy or attack his or her opponent. Id.
“Adverse party,” on the other hand, is not clearly defined in the report. Id.
290 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.645(1) (West Supp. 2011).
291 WASH. FINAL REPORT, supra note 281.
292 See generally supra Part IV.B.1.
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sion is “phrased in hortatory, not mandatory terms.”293  Moreover, campaign
finance reporting statutes, although prevalent throughout the United States,294
are still largely ineffective at informing parties about campaign contributions
received by judicial candidates in a timely manner.295  If parties are not able to
obtain this information, they will not be able to move for disqualification.
Admittedly, mandatory disclosure is an “incomplete solution in the sense that it
only provides the grounds for disqualification.”296  However, when paired with
mandatory recusal language, the two mechanisms combine to ensure that due
process is being preserved.
A. A Brief History of Poor Campaign Finance Disclosure
Campaign disclosure laws serve one essential purpose: “informing the
public about who is seeking to win government influence through election
spending.”297  Disclosure law is particularly important in determining from
whom candidates are receiving independent expenditures.298  The National
Institute on Money in State Politics has commented on the lack of adequate
disclosure laws in the United States: “[m]illions of dollars spent by special
interests each year to influence state elections go essentially unreported to the
public.  [Independent expenditures] form the single-largest loop-hole in the
laws . . . implementing transparency in state electoral politics.”299  Indeed, it
was a West Virginia disclosure law that revealed Don Blankenship’s $2.5 mil-
lion contribution through And for the Sake of the Kids, an independent expen-
diture committee.300
Campaign finance disclosure laws are largely inconsistent and ineffective
in the United States.301  The duty to report campaign contributions typically
falls on the candidate or party receiving the money, not the individual or organ-
ization giving the money.302  In state elections, campaign spending is reported
to the state, not a central entity like the Federal Election Commission for fed-
eral spending.303  States often have vastly different campaign disclosure laws
293 James Sample & Michael Young, Invigorating Judicial Disqualification: Ten Potential
Reforms, 92 JUDICATURE 26, 29 (2008) (citing John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and
Judicial Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 242 (1987)).
294 See Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign
Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449, 471-72 (1988) (noting that all fifty states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia require judicial candidates to file reports disclosing all campaign
contributions).
295 See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Corporate Campaign Spending:
Giving Shareholders a Voice 11 (2010), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/54a676e481f0
19bfb8_bvm6ivakn.pdf (reporting on failure of campaign disclosure generally).
296 SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 42, at 28.
297 SAMPLE ET AL. 2000-2009, supra note 100, at 64.
298 Id.
299 LINDA KING, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, INDECENT DISCLO-
SURE: PUBLIC ACCESS TO INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE INFORMATION AT THE STATE LEVEL 4
(2007), available at http://www.followthemoney.org/press/Reports/200708011.pdf.
300 Id. at 62.
301 TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 292, at 11.
302 Id.
303 Id.
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and regulations.304  While states have improved access to campaign finance
data, a number of states still lack basic features to inform the electorate.  For
example, as of 2008, only twenty-four of the forty-two states that operate elec-
tronic filing programs actually mandate their use for both statewide and legisla-
tive candidates.305  Additionally, only twenty-seven states provide a searchable
database of contributions and expenditures.306  Finally, only twenty-seven
states require last-minute independent expenditures to be disclosed.307  It is
unacceptable for any state not to provide easily accessible and constantly
updated campaign finance information to their residents.
B. Fixing the Lack of Transparency in Judicial Elections
Fortunately, Citizens United reaffirmed the constitutionality of disclosure
laws and their legitimate purpose in providing the electorate with information
about election-related spending sources.308  Therefore, in addition to requiring
disqualification based on a threshold amount of campaign contributions, states
should implement a system that: (1) mandates disclosure for all contributions of
$100 or more; (2) replaces inefficient reporting systems with a twenty-four-
hour requirement; and (3) creates an easily accessible, sortable, and searchable
online database of all campaign support received by a candidate, including
independent expenditures.
Judicial candidates and independent expenditure committees should be
required to disclose all contributions of $100 or more.  The Judicial Council of
California made a similar recommendation in its December 2009 report.309
The Council recommended that trial judges be required to disclose to all inter-
ested parties and counsel appearing before them in a case, all contributions of
$100 made directly or indirectly to the judge’s campaign.310  The California
State Legislature included this provision in CCP § 170.1(9), but it omitted dis-
closure requirements for indirect contributions.311  In making this recommen-
dation, the Council hoped to “enhance public trust and confidence in an
impartial judiciary.”312  Interestingly, this proposal placed the burden on the
judge to be aware of contributions to his or her campaign and to disseminate
the information to the parties.  Ideally, a judge should be able to disclose his or
her receipt of contributions to a state agency, which, in turn, would make the
information available such that reporting directly to the parties would not be
necessary.  In addition, independent expenditure committees in each state
should be required to file reports and expenditures with a state agency within
304 Id.; see generally CAL. VOTER FOUND. ET AL., GRADING STATE DISCLOSURE 2008:
EVALUATING STATES’ EFFORTS TO BRING SUNLIGHT TO POLITICAL MONEY (2008), available
at http://www.campaigndisclosure.org/gradingstate/GSD08.pdf.
305 CAL. VOTER FOUND. ET AL., supra note 301, at 2 (citing findings of the Campaign Dis-
closure Project).
306 Id. at 3.
307 Id. at 5.
308 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 885 (2010).
309 See COMM’N FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS, supra note 190, at 36-44 (discussing recommen-
dations regarding mandatory disclosure and disqualification).
310 COMM’N FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS, supra note 190, at 34.
311 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.1(a)(9)(C) (West 2006).
312 COMM’N FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS, supra note 190, at 36.
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twenty-four hours so the American people know “whether corporate and unions
contributions are being channeled through straw organizations or
middlemen.”313
However, the Judicial Council’s proposal did not go far enough in mandat-
ing full disclosure.  In order to place a check on a judge’s disclosed financial
information, litigants and other interested parties must be able to view that
information on an easily accessible, sortable, and searchable online database.
This would allow parties to quickly determine whether a judge has received
campaign support from anyone appearing before that judge in a case.  Assum-
ing the state has also passed a disqualification rule based on campaign contribu-
tions, parties could use the publicly accessible information to support a motion
to disqualify.
Finally, judges should be required to post all direct and indirect campaign
disclosure data on a state website within twenty-four hours of receipt of those
funds.  The Judicial Council of California was justifiably concerned that a pub-
lic posting of contribution information could compel litigants and attorneys to
match contributions from the opposing party.314  However, full disclosure and
near-instantaneous reporting would ensure that last-minute contributions are
visible to all interested parties, providing a crucial check on those that may try
to buy justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
Current state efforts to implement reform requiring mandatory disqualifi-
cation of a judge based on campaign support are positive steps in the path to
controlling the growing influence of money in the judiciary.  Unfortunately,
with the recent decision in Citizens United315—which ruled that, under the
First Amendment, Congress cannot limit corporate spending in support of a
candidate316—corporations have more influence than ever over the election of
judges.317  In his dissent, Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens warned that
Citizens United “unleashes the floodgates of corporate and union general trea-
sury spending in [judicial elections].”318  Indeed, individuals like Don Blanken-
ship, are now able to dip into corporate coffers in addition to personal funds to
313 A Comprehensive Disclosure Regime in the Wake of the Supreme Court’s Decision in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, SUNLIGHT FOUND., http://sunlightfounda-
tion.com/policy/documents/comprehensive-disclosure-regime-wake-supreme-court/ (last vis-
ited Apr. 18, 2011) (describing an analogous suggestion for political candidates for federal
office).
314 COMM’N FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS, supra note 190, at 34.
315 See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
316 See id. at 886.
317 Jeffrey Toobin, legal analyst for CNN and author of THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET
WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT (2007), suggests that the Citizens United decision will have
greater impact on state courts than on the national level because corporations and labor
unions “will get better bang for their buck” in that arena. Bill Moyers Journal: Jeffrey
Toobin (PBS television broadcast Feb. 19, 2010), available at http://www.pbs.org/moyers/
journal/02192010/watch2.html.
318 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 968 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
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provide substantial campaign support to judicial candidates.319  The need for
judicial recusal reform has never been greater.
While it remains to be seen whether contributions conclusively drive judi-
cial decision-making,320 state courts—in accordance with Caperton—should
adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires to protect
against the probability of bias caused by excessive and disproportionate cam-
paign support.321  Whether a low or high disqualification threshold is used,
states must be careful to adopt an amount that sufficiently addresses the vari-
ance in contribution levels among judicial races in differently populated coun-
ties, potential gaming of the system by unscrupulous litigants, and the respect
traditionally afforded to judicial independence.
Unfortunately, the uncertainty involved in implementing a threshold
amount, by itself, may prevent states from ever adopting it into their respective
judicial codes and laws.  Moreover, even if a threshold rule is adopted, courts
may limit their effect over free speech concerns.  Therefore, the only viable
solution to increased contributions in the judiciary—other than moving to a
system that removes private money entirely from the selection process—is to
combine mandatory disqualification with full disclosure.  Mandating disclosure
for all contributions of $100 or more, requiring faster campaign reporting, and
creating an easily accessible, sortable, and searchable online database of judi-
cial campaign finance data would give litigants, lawyers, and the public the
assurance they need in the face of horror stories like Caperton and the ever-
increasing contributions to judicial candidates.
319 SAMPLE ET AL. 2006, supra note 99, at 9.
320 McCall & McCall, supra note 103, at 216.
321 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (“‘Judicial integrity is,
in consequence, a state interest of the highest order.’”) (quoting Republican Party of Minn.
v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J. concurring)).
